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ABSTRACT
Cybercriminals abuse Online Social Networks (OSNs) to lure vic-
tims into a variety of spam. Among different spam types, a less
explored area is OSN abuse that leverages the telephony channel
to defraud users. Phone numbers are advertized via OSNs, and
users are tricked into calling these numbers. To expand the reach of
such scam / spam campaigns, phone numbers are advertised across
multiple platforms like Facebook, Twitter, GooglePlus, Flickr, and
YouTube. In this paper, we present the first data-driven characteriza-
tion of cross-platform campaigns that use multiple OSN platforms
to reach their victims and use phone numbers for monetization.
We collect ∼23M posts containing ∼1.8M unique phone num-
bers from Twitter, Facebook, GooglePlus, Youtube, and Flickr over
a period of six months. Clustering these posts helps us identify
202 campaigns operating across the globe with Indonesia, United
States, India, and United Arab Emirates being the most promi-
nent originators. We find that even though Indonesian campaigns
generate highest volume (∼3.2M posts), only 1.6% of the accounts
propagating Indonesian campaigns have been suspended so far.
By examining campaigns running across multiple OSNs, we dis-
cover that Twitter detects and suspends ∼93% more accounts than
Facebook. Therefore, sharing intelligence about abuse-related user
accounts across OSNs can aid in spam detection. According to our
dataset, around ∼35K victims and ∼$8.8M could have been saved
if intelligence was shared across the OSNs. By analyzing phone
number based spam campaigns running on OSNs, we highlight the
unexplored variety of phone-based attacks surfacing on OSNs.
1 INTRODUCTION
The increasing popularity of Online Social Networks (OSNs) has
attracted a cadre of criminals who craft large-scale phishing and
spam campaigns targeted against OSN users. Traditionally, spam-
mers have been driving traffic to their websites by luring users to
click on URLs in their posts on OSNs [11, 13, 32]. A significant frac-
tion of OSN spam research has looked at solutions driven by URL
blacklists [11, 31], manual classification [5], and honeypots [19, 30].
Since defence mechanisms against malicious / spam URLs have
already matured, cybercriminals are looking for other ways to en-
gage with users. Telephony has become a cost-effective medium
for such engagement, and phone numbers are now being used to
drive call traffic to spammer operated resources (e.g., call centers,
Over-The-Top messaging applications like WhatsApp).
In this paper, we explore a data-driven approach to understand
OSN abuse that makes use of phone numbers as action tokens in
the realization / monetization phase of spam campaigns. Telephony
has turned out to be an effective tool for spammers because Internet
crime reports suggest that people fell victim to phone scams leading
to a loss of $7.4B in 2015 for Americans alone 1. Specifically, in the
phone-based abuse of OSNs, spammers advertise phone numbers
under their control via OSN posts and lure OSN users into calling
these numbers. Since spammers use phone calls to trap victims, it is
safe to assume that spammers would provide real phone numbers
under their control. In addition, advertising phone numbers reduce
spammers’ overhead of finding the set of potential victims who
can be targeted via the phone. Over phone conversations, they try
convincing the victims that their services are genuine, and deceive
them into making payments [24]. To maximize their reach and
impact, we observe that spammers disseminate similar content
across multiple OSNs.
While URLs help spammers attract victims to websites that
host malicious content, phone numbers provide more leverage
to spammers. Due to the inherent trust associated with the tele-
phony medium and the impact of human touch over phone calls,
spammers using phone numbers stand a better chance of convinc-
ing and hence are likely to make more impact. Besides, they can
use fewer phone numbers as compared to URLs; a large number
of URLs are required to evade filtering mechanisms incorporated
by OSNs. 2 Moreover, the monetization and advertising channel
in phone-based campaigns i.e., (Phone) and (Web) respectively is
different as compared to a single channel (Web) used in URL-based
campaigns. Hence, phone-based spam requires correlation of abuse
information across channels which makes it harder for OSN service
providers to build effective solutions. Since the modus operandi in
URL-based and phone-based spam campaigns is different, leaving
phone-based spams unexplored can limit OSN service providers’
ability to defend their users from spam. While extensive solutions
have been built to educate users about URL-based spam [18], lim-
ited education is available for phone-based attacks. This is evident
from several well publicized and long running Tech Support spam
campaigns (since 2008) that use phone numbers to lure victims lead-
ing to huge financial losses in the past, as reported by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation [25]. Although detecting and avoiding OSN
abuse using phone numbers is so critical now, to the best of our
knowledge, this space is largely unexplored.
In this paper, we address this gap by taking the first step in identi-
fying and characterizing spam campaigns that abuse phone numbers
across multiple OSNs. Studying phone-based spam across multiple
OSNs provides a new perspective and helps in understanding how
spammers work in coordination to increase their impact. From 22M
posts collected from Twitter, Facebook, GooglePlus, YouTube, and
1https://blog.truecaller.com/2017/04/19/truecaller-us-spam-report-2017/
2https://support.twitter.com/articles/90491
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Flickr, we identify 202 campaigns running across different coun-
tries, leveraging 806 unique abusive phone numbers. Studying these
campaigns, we make the following key observations:
(1) We find that the cross-platform phone based spam campaigns
originate from more than 16 countries, but most of them
come from Indonesia, United States of America (USA), In-
dia, and United Arab Emirates (UAE). These campaigns are
supported less number of phone numbers as compared to
URLs, perhaps due to (a) the high cost of acquiring a phone
number, and (b) weak defense mechanisms against phone -
based spam. Victims that fall prey to these campaigns are
offered banned filmography, personal products and a variety
of other services; but the services are not delivered even after
successful payment.
(2) As reported in earlier research [12], we also find evidence
that suggests spammers collude to maximize their reach ei-
ther by creating multiple accounts or promoting other spam-
mers’ content. To evade suspension strategies of each OSN,
spammers keep the volume per account low. Our results
show that accounts are suspended after being active for 33
days (on average); while literature suggests that spammers
involved in URL-based spam campaigns, on the other hand,
could survive only for three days after their first post [32].
In addition, 68.7% of spammer accounts are never suspended.
Again, this suggests a crucial need to build effective solutions
to combat phone-based spam.
(3) Our analysis also suggests that OSN service providers should
work together in the fight against phone-based spam cam-
paigns. By examining phone numbers involved in campaigns
across OSNs, we find that although all OSNs are consistently
being abused, Twitter is the most preferred OSN for propa-
gating a phone campaign. By analyzing spammers’ multiple
identities across OSNs, we find that Twitter is able to suspend
93.3% more accounts than Facebook. Thus, cross-platform
intelligence can be useful in preventing the onset and reduc-
ing the lifetime of a campaign on a particular network with
good accuracy. We estimate that cross-platform intelligence
can help protect 35,407 victims across OSNs, resulting in
potential savings of $8.8M.
Altogether, our results shed light on phone-based spam cam-
paigns where spammers are using one channel (OSN) to spread
their content, and the other channel (voice / SMS / message via
phone) to convince their victims to fall prey to their campaigns.
Given that no timely and effective filters exist on either channel to
combat such spam, there is an imperative need to build one.
2 RELATEDWORK
Spam is a growing problem for OSNs, and several researchers have
looked at different ways to combat it. In this section, we present
prior research in detecting spam campaigns on OSNs.
Handling non-phone based spam: There has been a large
body of work that reports the existence of spam on multiple OSNs
like YouTube [5], Twitter [13], and Facebook [11]. Thomas et al.
studied the characteristics of suspended accounts on Twitter [32].
With an in-depth analysis of several spam campaigns, they reported
that 77% spam accounts suspended by Twitter were taken down on
the day of their first tweet. Apart from this, there has been work
done to differentiate a spammer from a non-spammer [2, 4, 20, 33,
35]. Lumezanu et al. studied the spread of URL campaigns on email
and Twitter and found that spam domains receive better coverage
when they appear both on Twitter and email [21]. In addition to
characterizing URL-based spam, methods have been proposed for
detecting [8, 19, 34] and preventing [10, 28] such campaigns. While
a lot of work has been done on characterizing and detecting URL-
based spam campaigns, campaigns abusing phone numbers have
been largely ignored.
Handling phone based spam: A large fraction of phone spam
includes robocalling and spoofing, wherein spammers call the vic-
tims and trick them into giving personal or financial information 3.
Studies have shown that, in spam activities, phone numbers are
more stable over time than email, and hence can be more helpful
in identifying spammers [9, 17]. Christin et al. analyzed a type
of scam targeting Japanese users, threatening to reveal the users’
browsing history, in case they do not give them money [7]. In
studies mentioned above, the authors relied on publicly available
datasets to perform their analyses. In contrast, we develop an infras-
tructure to collect millions of posts from OSNs, cluster them into
campaigns, and conduct our analyses. Researchers have investi-
gated phone number abuse by analyzing cross-application features
in Over-The-Top applications [16], cross-channel SMS abuse [29],
and by characterizing honeypot numbers [3, 14, 15, 23]. Recently,
Miramirkhani et al. studied the Tech Support campaign that abuse
phone numbers, from the perspective of domains that were used
to host malicious content [24]. The authors also interacted with
spammers to understand their social engineering tactics. While
they focused on URLs and domains abused by spammers, we study
the cross-platform spread of phone-based spam campaigns across
OSNs, along with strategies adopted by spammers for sustainability
and visibility. Besides, we highlight how cross-platform intelligence
about spam accounts can be shared across OSNs to aid in spam
detection.
3 DATASET
In this section, we discuss our methodology for collecting phone
numbers, posts and other metadata; which we use later to find
campaigns on OSNs. These campaigns are then tagged as benign
or spam. Figure 1 shows the architecture of our data collection sub-
system that is used to collect phone numbers across multiple OSNs.
We picked Twitter as the starting point to find phone numbers,
as it provides easier access to large amounts of data as compared
to other online social networks [26]. We set up a framework to
collect a stream of tweets containing phone numbers. Some of the
keywords used in data collection and regular expressions used to
extract phone number from a text are listed in the Appendix 8.1. For
each unique phone number received every day, a query was made
to other OSNs viz. Facebook, 4 GooglePlus, Flickr, and YouTube,
and for every search, we stored the following details: user details
(user ID, screen name, number of followers and friends), post details
(time of publication, text, URL, number of retweets, likes, shares,
3https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0076-phone-scams
4Collecting data from Facebook was challenging. In April 2015, Facebook deprecated
their post-search API end-point 5 , so we used an Android mobile OAuth token to
search content using the Graph API [16].
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and reactions), and whether the ID were suspended. The data col-
lection ran over a period of six months, between April 25, 2016 and
October 26, 2016. Our system collected 22,690,601 posts containing
1,845,150 unique phone numbers, posted by 3,365,017 unique user
accounts on five different OSNs. After removing noise (i.e., the
posts which do not contain a phone number), the filtered set was
used for finding campaigns.
Twitter 
Sample Feed
Phone 
Number 
Extraction
Phone
Numbers
Cross-Platform 
Data Expansion
Data
Cleaning
Filtered
Dataset
Suspended
IDs
OSN 
Posts
Text 
Clustering
Spam Campaigns
Figure 1: System Architecture for Data Collection across
Multiple OSNs.
We acknowledge that our dataset may contain two kinds of bias:
(1) Only 1% sample of all public tweets is available from the Twitter
Streaming API; it can underestimate the spam campaigns observed
on Twitter. (2) Since we treat Twitter as the starting point, we may
miss some campaigns which are popular on other social networks,
but not on Twitter. However, Twitter provides best access to user
posts, justifying our choice.
Campaigns:A campaign is defined as a collection of posts made
by a set of users sharing similar text and phone numbers. To make
sure that we do not tag any benign campaign as spam, we filtered
out the phone numbers used by even one Twitter verified account.
Every phone number, say ph1, is represented by a set of frequent
unigram tokens which occur around the phone number. All posts
that contain at-least 33% tokens from the representative token set
are put together in a cluster; indicating posts related to the phone
number. Different phone numbers, say ph1 and ph2, are put together
in the same cluster if the average Jaccard coefficient between the
corresponding set of posts is greater than 0.7. We calculated dif-
ferent values of Jaccard coefficient and average silhouette scores
to measure quality of clusters [1], and found 0.7 as knee point for
corresponding value of silhouette score as 0.8. All users that post
about any phone number in the clustered set are put together. A
cluster thus formed is marked as a campaign. Using this method,
we found 22,390 campaigns in the dataset, collectively amounting
to ∼10.9M posts.
Spam Campaigns:We flag a campaign as spam if it meets the
following criteria: (a) phone number involved in the campaign is
present in the United States Federal Trade Commission’s Do Not
Call (DNC) dataset 6, or (b) even if one OSN account involved in the
campaign is suspended. Further, to be able to characterize the spam
campaigns in detail, we focused only on campaigns with at least
5000 posts. With this, we identified 6,171 out of 22,390 campaigns
as spam. From this set of campaigns, we did a manual inspection
to verify if the campaign is indeed spam. This results in a working
dataset of 202 campaigns comprising of ∼4.9M posts. During manual
6https://www.ftc.gov/site-information/open-government/data-sets/do-not-call-data
inspection, we also assigned topics to the 202 campaigns, where
multiple campaigns could be assigned the same topic. For instance, a
campaign selling shoes and other selling jackets would be assigned
the topic – “Product Marketing".
4 CHARACTERIZING SPAM CAMPAIGNS
In this section, we focus on the following research questions. Where
do spam campaigns originate from? Do spammers use automation
when posting phone numbers or answering “phone calls”? What
does a spammer OSN account suspension depend on? What is the
typical modus operandi of the spammers?
4.1 Where does Phone-based Spam Originate?
It is important to know from which countries does the spam origi-
nate; it can be used in developing anti-spam filtering solution. We
assume that the country associated with a phone number is the
source country. For the analysis, we need to extract the country
of the spam phone number. This is done either by identifying (a)
the language of the post containing the spam phone number via
the ‘lang’ field in the tweet object, or (b) by the country code using
Google’s phone number library. 7 These two methods helped in
identifying countries for 127 campaigns. For rest of the campaigns,
we called up the top two frequently occurring phone numbers in the
campaign using Tropo 8, a VoIP software that can be used to make
spoofed calls. We recorded all the calls and used Google’s Speech
API 9 to detect language and country of the campaign. We could
identify origin country for 26 more campaigns; for the remaining 49,
the country is unknown. Table 1 presents topic distribution across
various campaigns originating from different countries along with
the average number of posts being made in each campaign. While
majority of the spam was similar to advanced-fee scam 10, where
spammers trick victims to make payments in advance, there were
certain different type of campaigns observed in the dataset as well:
Hacking (Tech Support) and Alternating Beliefs (Love Guru). In
the LoveGuru campaign, astrologers promise victims to fix their
love and marriage related problems. In the Tech Support campaign,
spammers pose as technical support representatives or claim to be
associated with big technological companies (like Amazon, Google,
Microsoft, Quebec, Norton, Yahoo, Mcafee, Dell, HP, Apple, Adobe,
TrendMicro, and Comcast) and offer technical support fixes.
Top four source countries selected by the volume of campaigns
viz. Indonesia, United States of America (USA), India, and United
Arab Emirates (UAE) show interesting characteristics. From Table 1,
we observe that there is a good overlap of campaign categories
across countries, while some countries have specific categories of
campaigns running. Among all the campaign categories, volume
generated by Indonesian campaigns is significantly higher than any
other country.
4.2 Do Spammers use Automation?
While investigating further, we found that 99.3% pairs of consec-
utive posts related to the same campaign appeared on Twitter in
7https://github.com/googlei18n/libphonenumber
8https://www.tropo.com/
9https://cloud.google.com/speech/
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Table 1: Distribution of Campaigns across Topics and Source
Countries. (#C denotes the number of campaigns).
Country Campaign Topics #C #Posts
Argentina Party ReservationsPornography
1
1
39,476
30,751
Chile Delivering Goods 1 6,691
Columbia Hotel BookingPornography
1
1
18,228
5,324
Ghana Alternating Beliefs (Marriage, Anxiety) 2 12,825
Guatemala Product Marketing 1 8,821
India
Hotel Booking
Alternating Beliefs (Marriage, Anxiety)
Hacking(Tech Support)
1
1
1
10,986
15,128
43,552
Indonesia
Hotel Booking
Product Marketing
Pornography
Alternating Beliefs (Marriage, Anxiety))
Purchasing Followers
Finance, Real Estate
Selling Adult Products
Uncategorized
1
75
4
7
15
3
5
3
8,291
2,689,616
164,382
101,799
406,713
23,700
48,109
29,043
Kuwait Charity (Donation) 1 46,494
Mexico Pornography 1 8,204
Nigeria Alternating Beliefs (Marriage, Anxiety) 1 29,226
Pakistan Finance, Real Estate 1 16,058
Spain Charity (Donation) 1 14,311
UAE Escorts 5 69,263
USA
Party Reservations
Product Marketing
Pornography
Alternating Beliefs (Marriage, Anxiety)
Escorts
8
1
1
1
1
172,090
22,804
19,653
12,936
9,652
UK EscortsCharity (Donation)
1
2
9,268
17,184
Venezuela Hotel BookingFree Games, Downloads
1
1
6,813
9,028
Unknown
Party Reservations
Hotel Booking
Product Marketing
Free Games, Books, Downloads
Pornography
Alternating Beliefs (Marriage, Anxiety)
Finance, Loans, Real Estate
Charity (donation)
Uncategorized
10
2
10
1
17
5
2
2
2
323,565
11,334
108,634
8,834
211,714
48,093
34,226
29,740
10,266
less than 10 minutes. Given that a major fraction of content ap-
peared within a few minutes, it is likely that content generation is
automated. To ascertain this, we looked at the information of the
client (provided by the Twitter API) used by spammers to interact
with the Twitter API or their web portal. We found that most of the
content was generated using ‘twittbot.net’, a popular bot service,
known to be used by spammers [32]. Apart from the bot service,
several other clients like RoundTeam (0.25%), IFFTT (0.03%), Buffer
(0.017%), and Botize (0.016%), were used for Twitter. Besides, we
found that volume per phone number was also high in Indonesian
campaigns; 80% phone numbers had more than 1000 posts. One
would assume that volume per phone number would be low since
there are humans at the other end to service the requests. However,
by processing the text in the posts created in this campaign, we
found that spammers requested users to communicate via SMS or
WhatsApp (∼ 71% posts). This explains why spammers would be
able to handle the load of interacting with victims. There are many
other advantages of using these messaging services – spammers
can further send phishing messages to victims, communicate with
them unmonitored, and potentially use automated bots to reply to
SMSs or Whatsapp messages.
4.3 What Factors Govern Spammers’
Suspension?
As expected, we find that the visibility (number of likes, shares,
and retweets) of a post is positively correlated with the number of
posts (Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.97). While this may sound
intuitive, the number of accounts that were suspended within a
campaign were not positively correlated with the number of posts.
We noticed that even though the volume generated by Indonesian
campaigns was 98.2% higher than Indian campaigns, the fraction of
users suspended in Indian campaigns was 85.6% higher. Further, we
observed that the account suspension is dependent on the nature
of campaigns; campaigns providing escort services or technical
support services had more accounts suspended.
Surprisingly, for similar escort service campaign running in two
different countries, USA and UAE, there was a significant difference
in the number of accounts suspended. Before concluding that the
country plays a major role in account suspension, we performed
detailed analysis as follows.
Figure 2: Comparison of campaigns running in the top 4
countries – Indonesia, USA, India, and UAE across different
campaign categories. While visibility that a post receives is
positively correlated with volume, account suspension in a
campaign is not. Escort service and Tech Support campaigns
had largest percentage of suspended accounts. The number
of users suspended is represented by * and # denotes the frac-
tion of posts getting visibility.
The number of posts generated by escort campaign running in
the USA (9,652) was lower than that running in UAE (69,263), but
55.6% user accounts were suspended in the USA in comparison to
only 9.1% accounts suspended in UAE. We looked at several reasons
which could potentially lead to account suspension – volume gen-
erated per user or URLs used in the posts. We noticed that volume
4
per user was higher for UAE users (Figure 3(a)), number of URLs
shared in UAE campaign was higher, and words used in both the
campaigns had a good overlap. Also, from Figure 3(b), we observed
that inter-arrival time between two consecutive posts made by all
the users in the USA (41s on an average) is lesser than that of posts
made in the UAE campaign (392s on an average).
(a) (b)
Figure 3: Comparing Escort service campaign in USA vs.
UAE. Even though volume generated per USA account is
lower than UAE accounts (a), inter-arrival time between two
consecutive posts in the USA is lesser which could be a po-
tential reason for suspension of accounts (b).
4.4 What is the Spammers’ Modus Operandi?
To ascertain the attack methodology the victims faced, we per-
formed an experiment after receiving our institute’s Institutional
Review Board (IRB) approval. Pretending to be a potential victim,
we called up phone numbers mentioned in campaigns selling adult
(Viagra) pills in USA and UAE. In Indonesia, we interacted with
spammers selling herbal products, and in India with those pro-
moting tech support and astrology services (providing solutions
to marriage and love problems). To avoid time zone conflict, we
called the spammers in their local time of the day. Overall, we made
41 calls to different phone numbers from Indonesia, India, USA
and UAE. A transcript of an interaction with a USA based spam-
mer selling Viagra pills is listed in the Appendix 8.2. Apart from
Indonesia, campaigns from other countries had an IVR deployed,
before reaching a spammer. We posit this can help in load balancing
between limited human resources on the spammers’ end. Due to
language limitation in Indonesia, spammers preferred chatting over
platforms like WhatsApp, where they were extremely responsive.
The campaigns in USA and UAE were not limited by any deliv-
ery location; they had a usual delivery time of 2–4 weeks. These
campaigns were operating solely over the phone and had no option
of visiting an online portal to make the transaction. The attackers
confidently asked for the credit card details over the phone even
though banks advise otherwise. Spammers from Indonesia told
that they would start delivery only after receiving the payment,
which was to be done via bank transfer. During the interactions,
spammers were persuasive in selling products by claiming their
products to be the best as compared to similar products in the mar-
ket. Tech support campaigns in India were providing service to
users remotely over the Internet and charged over call once the
issue was ‘fixed’. The catch was that the spammers pretended that
there was a problem with the victims’ computer and then tried to
convince the victim to pay them to fix it, as reported in several
complaints 11. Another astrology based spam campaign running in
India tricked by promising to fix users’ marriage and love related
problems within 48 hours 12. We called 4 numbers in different In-
dian states. Interestingly, all the spammers had a similar way of
dealing with the problem, where they asked to send personal details
over WhatsApp.
It is evident that spammers running campaigns in different coun-
tries deploy similar mechanisms to let the victim reach them (posts
on social media), to set up the product / service delivery operation
(product delivery post payment and service delivery prior to pay-
ment), andmodel of payment (details transfer via phone,WhatsApp,
verbal). It is the product delivery operation that creates deliberate
confusion for a victim; intuitively, the delivery mechanism is similar
for benign campaigns. Spammers leverage the advantage of similar
delivery mechanisms, offer fake promises and later do not deliver.
5 CHARACTERIZING CROSS-PLATFORM
SPAM CAMPAIGNS
In this section, we aim to answer the following research questions.
Are spam campaigns run in a cross-OSN manner? How does the
content cross-pollinate across OSNs? How do spammers maximize
visibility? To what extent OSNs are able to detect phone based
spam? Can existing intelligence on URL based spam be trivially
adapted to handle the growing phone based spam problem? Can
cross-platform intelligence help?
5.1 Do Phone-based Spam Campaigns run in a
Cross-OSN Manner?
We observed that spam campaigns do not limit themselves to one
OSN and are rather present on multiple networks. The distribution
of posts across platforms in top 3 spam campaigns: Loveguru (from
Alternating Beliefs category), Tech Support, and Indonesian Herbal
Product (from Product Marketing category) is shown in Table 2.
Even though Twitter has the largest fraction (possibly thanks to
the first data source bias in our data collection method), all OSNs
are abused to carry out spam campaigns.
Table 2: Top Cross-Platform Spam Campaigns
Campaign TW FB G+ YT FL
Tech Support 28,984 2,151 7,830 2,850 1,737
LoveGuru 6,934 1,418 4,257 101 63
Indonesia Herbal Product 1,443,619 9,238 21 46 336
Due to lack of space, in this section, we focus on studying in
detail the Tech Support campaign. The details for other campaigns
are available at http://bit.ly/phcamp-dash. Tech support scams have
been around for a long period 13,incurring financial losses of $2.2M
to victims in 2016 alone, as reported by the US Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) [25]. Earlier, attackers used to call victims
offering to fix their computer or PC. Now, attackers have changed
11https://800notes.com/Phone.aspx/1-800-549-5301/2
12https://www.complaintboard.in/complaints-reviews/
vashikaran-fake-vashikaran-fraud-cheater-money-taker-l149781.html
13https://blog.malwarebytes.com/tech-support-scams/
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their strategy; instead of calling victims, attackers float their phone
numbers on OSNs and ask users to call them in case they need any
technical assistance related to their computers. Once the victim
calls the phone number, the attacker asks for remote access to
their machine to diagnose the problem. The attacker fudges the
expected problems with victim‘s machine and convinces her to get
it fixed. The reason this campaign is identified as spam, is because
attackers deceive in believing that there exists some problem with
their PC and charge money in return. Previous work has focused
on the methods used by attackers to convince the victim and to
make money [24]. In this paper, we are interested in looking at the
cross-platform behavior of such tech support scam campaigns.
Over the course of six months of data collection, we got a total
of 43,552 posts spread across all the five OSNs propagating to the
extent of 41 phone numbers. The complete dataset description for
tech support campaigns is shown in Table 3.
Table 3: Statistics for Tech Support Campaign
Features TW FB G+ YT FL
Total Posts 28,984 2,151 7,830 2,850 1,737
Posts with URLs 25,245 1,391 5,714 227 1,503
Distinct Phone Numbers 41 33 37 39 20
Distinct User IDs 748 289 360 433 79
Distinct Posts 16,142 1,797 6,570 2,050 1,449
Distinct URLs 68 951 3,189 80 293
As phone numbers are one of the primary tokens used by spam-
mers, we examined carrier information tied to each number to
identify what kind of phone numbers spammers use viz. landline,
mobile, VoIP, or toll-free). We derived this information from several
online services like Twilio (mobile carrier information) 14, True-
caller (spam score assigned to the phone number) 15, and HLR
lookups (current active location of the phone number). 16 We found
that all the phone numbers used in the Tech Support campaign were
toll-free numbers. Using a toll-free number offers several advan-
tages to a spammer: (1) increased credibility: it does not incur a cost
to the person calling, hence people perceive it to be legitimate, (2)
it provides international presence: spammers can be reached from
any part of the world. Further, we found that spammers used ser-
vices like ATL, Bandwidth, and, Wiltel Communications to obtain
these toll-free numbers and that a majority of them were registered
between 2014 and 2016.
5.2 How does Content Cross-pollinate?
Now,we answer the following question: Is a particular OSN preferred
to start the spread of a campaign? Is there a specific pattern in the
way spam propagates on different OSNs?
Figure 4(a) shows the temporal pattern of content across OSNs.
Note that our data collection was done over a period of six months
while a campaign may have existed before and / or after this period.
Hence, while the longest detected active time for a campaign in
our dataset is 186 days, the actual time may be greater. A majority
of these posts are densely packed into a small number of short
time bursts, while the entire campaign spans a much longer period.
14https://www.twilio.com/
15http://truecaller.com/
16https://www.hlr-lookups.com/
(a) Posts across OSNs (b) Inter-arrival Time of Posts
appearing on OSNs
Figure 4: Temporal properties of Tech Support Campaign
across OSNs – all OSNs are abused to spread the campaign
but volume is maximum on Twitter. Inter-arrival time be-
tween two consecutive posts is minimum for Twitter. Spam-
mers began to heavily abuse Flickr towards the end of our
data collection.
Though the volume of content is significantly higher on Twitter, all
OSNs are consistently being abused for propagation. Inter-arrival
time, i.e., the average time between two successive posts is observed
to be least on Twitter (308s), as shown in Figure 4(b). It is interesting
to note that a few campaigns on Flickr have an inter-arrival time
between two posts close to 1s, even though the average inter-arrival
time is highest on Flickr. As Figure 4(a) shows, the volume on
Flickr increased during the last few weeks of our data collection
period. We divided the inter-arrival time into two time windows;
first 15 weeks, and last 11 weeks. We observed that the average
inter-arrival time in latter time window dropped from 9786s to
2543s which means spammers had started heavily abusing Flickr
to spread the Tech Support campaign. It is hard to ascertain the
motivation of the spammers in sending high volume content on
Twitter, but, we speculate one of the reasons could be the public
nature of the Twitter platform, as compared to closed OSNs like
Facebook. For all the phone numbers, we analyzed the appearance
of phone numbers on different OSNs, and the order in which they
appear, as reported in Table 4. For each network that is picked
Table 4: Distribution of phone numbers according to their
first appearance amongst OSNs. Flickr is never chosen as a
starting point and there is no particular sequence in which
spam propagates across OSNs.
Starting OSN #Cases Most common sequence
Twitter (TW) 12 TW→ G+→ YT
GooglePlus (G+) 10 G+→ TW→ YT→ FB→ FL
Facebook (FB) 6 FB→ G+→ TW→ YT
YouTube (YT) 13 YT→ G+→ TW→ FB
as the starting point, we identified the most common sequence
in which phone numbers appeared subsequently on other OSNs.
We found that Flickr was never chosen as the starting OSN to
initiate the spread of a phone number. Further, we noticed that the
posts originating from YouTube took the maximum time to reach a
different OSN with an average inter-OSN time of 5 hours.
To summarize, we observed that all OSNs were abused to spread
the Tech Support campaign, and no particular OSN was preferred
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to drive the campaign. In addition, there was no particular sequence
in which spam propagated across OSNs.
5.3 How do Spammers Maximize Visibility?
We observed various strategies adopted by spammers to increase
the dissemination of their posts. In this section, we discuss those
strategies and their effectiveness.
The Visibility of a post is defined as the action performed by
the user (consumer of the post) in terms of liking or sharing the
post, which accounts for traction a particular post received. For
each network, we define the value of visibility as follows: number
of likes and reshares on Facebook, +1s and reshares on GooglePlus,
number of likes and retweets on Twitter, and video like count on
YouTube. We did not consider Flickr in our analysis since Flickr
API gives only the view count of the image posted on the plat-
form. A user only viewing an image cannot be assumed to be a
victim of the campaign. To calculate visibility in all scenarios, we
collected the likes / retweets, plus-oners / reshares, and likes from
Twitter, GooglePlus, and Facebook respectively using their APIs.
Apart from calculating values for each visibility attribute, we also
collected properties of the user accounts involved, i.e., the IDs of
user accounts involved in retweeting / liking / resharing the content.
Due to rate limiting constraints on each of the APIs, we could not
fetch visibility information daily. We collected this data six months
after our data collection period, as posts take time to reach their
audience. Due to this, (1) we might have missed information of
tweets posted by suspended accounts, and (2) our total visibility
values represent a lower bound.
To increase the visibility of content, we observed that the spam-
mers use the following tricks: 67% of posts contained hashtags (for
marketing [6], gaining followers [22]), 82.7% of posts contained
URLs (for increased engagement with potential victims), 12.1% of
posts contained short URLs (for obfuscating the destination of a
URL and getting user engagement analytics), and 72% of posts con-
tained photos (as visual content gathers more attention). We also
noticed collusion between accounts and cross-referenced posts to
increase the visibility of the campaign.
Cross-referenced posts: We call a post cross-referenced if it
was posted to OSN X, but contains a URL redirecting to OSN Y. For
instance, a Twitter post containing a link ‘fb.me/xxxx’ which would
redirect to a different OSN, Facebook. Spammers either direct vic-
tims to existing posts or to another profile which is propagating the
same campaign on a different OSN. In the Tech Support campaign,
we observed that 3.2% of Facebook posts redirected to YouTube,
and 1.78% of posts redirected from GooglePlus to YouTube.
Collusion between accounts: In the Tech Support campaign,
we observed traces of collusion, i.e., spammers involved in a par-
ticular campaign, like / share each other’s posts on OSNs or like
their content to increase reachability. Collusion helps in cascading
information to other followers in the network.
We calculated the visibility received by all the posts after re-
moving likes / reshares / retweets by the colluders (i.e., accounts
spreading the campaign already present in the dataset). We noticed
that the posts containing the above-mentioned attributes (hashtags,
URLs, short URLs, photos, cross-referencing, and collusion) gar-
nered around ten times more visibility than posts not containing
them. Around 10% of the posts saw traces of collusion, contributing
to 20% of the total visibility. Maximum visibility (22.1% of total
visibility) was observed for posts containing hashtags. In addition,
we observed that a major chunk of visibility came from GooglePlus,
followed by Facebook. This shows that the audience targeted influ-
ences the visibility garnered by a particular campaign, as Google-
Plus is known to be consumed mostly by IT professionals 17.
5.4 To what Extent OSNs Suspend User
Accounts?
To aid in the propagation of a campaign, spammers manage multi-
ple accounts to, garner a wider audience, withstand account sus-
pension, and in general increase the volume. Individual spammer
accounts can either use automated techniques to aggressively post
about a campaign or use hand-crafted messages. In this section, we
examine the behavior of user accounts behind the Tech Support
campaign. Spammers want to operate accounts in a stealth mode,
which requires individual accounts to post few posts. It costs effort
to get followers to a spam account, and the number of ‘influential’
accounts owned by a spammer is limited. Thus, the spammer tends
to repeatedly use accounts to post content keeping volume low per
account (Figure 5(b)), while creating new accounts once in a while
(Figure 5(a)).
(a) New users created from time to time
for campaign sustainability.
(b) Volume per user kept low to evade
suspension.
Figure 5: New user accounts created from time to time and
volume per ID kept low, to avoid suspension in the Tech Sup-
port Campaign.
Long-lived user accounts:During our data collection, we found
that 68.7% (1,305) of the accounts were never suspended or taken
down on any of the five OSNs. This is in stark contrast to the URL
based campaigns [32], where the authors observed that 92% of
the user accounts were suspended within three days of their first
tweet. To take into account delays in the OSNs’ account suspension
algorithm, we queried all the accounts six months after the data col-
lection to determine which accounts were deleted / suspended. This
process consists of a bulk query to each OSN’s API with the profile
ID of the account. 18 For each of these accounts, we looked at the
time stamp of the first and last post within our dataset, after which
we assumed that the account was suspended immediately. Out of
17https://insight.globalwebindex.net/chart-of-the-day-who-is-most-likely-to-use-google
18If the account is deleted / suspended, (a) Twitter redirects to http://twitter.com/
suspended, and returns error 404, (b) Youtube returns ‘user not found’, (c) Facebook
returns error 403 in case the account is suspended, (d) GooglePlus throws a ‘not found’
error, (e) Flickr responds with a ‘user not found’ error.
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the accounts which were suspended, around 35% of the accounts
were suspended within a day of their first post; the longest lasting
account was active for 158 days, before finally getting suspended.
On an average, accounts got suspended after being active for 33
days. This is in clear contrast to users getting suspended within
three days for URL based spam campaigns, and thus, focused efforts
are needed to strengthen defense from evolving phone-based spam
campaigns.
5.5 Is Existing Intelligence based on URLs
Useful to Handle Phone-based Spam?
Apart from creating accounts to propagate content, and using phone
numbers to interact with victims, spammers also need a distinct
set of URLs to advertise. In this section, we look at the domains,
subdomains and URL shorteners used by spammers. Of all the posts,
we had 4,581 unique URLs and 594 distinct domains. Of all the URLs,
12.1% were shortened using bit.ly; 3% of them received over 69,917
clicks (data collected from bit.ly API), showing that the campaign
was fairly successful.
Given the prevalence of spam on OSNs, we examined the effec-
tiveness of existing blacklists to detect malicious domains. Specifi-
cally, we used Google safe browsing 19 and Web of Trust (WOT) 20
to see if they were effective in flagging domains as malicious. Web
of Trust categorizes the domains into several reputation buckets
along with the confidence to assign a category. Please note that
one domain may be listed in multiple categories. We marked a do-
main as malicious if the domain appeared in any of the following
categories – negative (malware, phishing, scam, potentially illegal),
questionable (adult content). We checked the URLs and domains
even after six months of data collection since blacklists may be slow
in updating response to new spam sites. We marked a URL mali-
cious if it was listed as malicious either by Google safe browsing or
WOT. We checked these domains against the blacklists, finding that
10% of the domains were blacklisted by WOT, none by Google safe
browsing. Overall, we found that existing URL infrastructure was
ineffective to blacklist URLs used in phone-based spam campaigns.
5.6 Can Cross-Platform Intelligence be used?
Given that existing URL infrastructure is ineffective, we study if
cross-platform intelligence across OSNs can be used. To this end,
we look at the spam user profiles across OSNs to figure out which
OSN is most effective in building the intelligence.
Homogeneous identity across OSNs: Simply analyzing users’
previous posts might not be sufficient, as users can switch between
multiple identities, making it hard for OSN service providers to
detect and block them. Moreover, spammers may appear legitimate
based on the small number of posts made by a single identity. The
challenge remains in analyzing the aggregate behavior of multiple
identities. To understand how user activity is correlated across
OSNs, we pose the question: do users have a unique identity on a
particular OSN or do they share identities across OSNs? Within the
same network, can we find the same users sharing multiple identities?
To answer this, we looked at user identities across different OSNs
in aggregate (multiple identities of the same user across different
19https://developers.google.com/safe-browsing/v4/lookup-api
20https://www.myWOT.com/wiki/API
OSNs) and individual (multiple identities of the same user on a
single OSN) forms. If the same user has multiple identities, sharing
similar name or username, it is said to exhibit a homogeneous
identity. To define user identity in a particular campaign, we used
two textual features: name and username [27]. Since networks like
YouTube and Google Plus do not provide the username, we restrict
matching to identities sharing the same name. We used Levenshtein
distance to find similarity in usernames. LD(si , sj ) is the Levenshtein
edit distance between usernames si and sj . Here, LD(si , sj ) = 1
means the strings are identical, while LD(si , sj ) = 0 means they
are completely different. After manual verification by comparing
profile images across OSNs, we found users having LD >= 0.7 are
homogeneous identities. We found four cases where multiple user
identities were found for the same user within the same network,
and in 65 instances, multiple user identities were present for the
same user in more than two networks. Specifically, we found 51
users sharing multiple identities across two different OSNs, and 10
users sharing multiple identities across 3 OSNs. We noticed that
these accounts shared same phone numbers across OSNs; some
accounts post more phone numbers that are part of tech support
campaign.
We found that the total number of posts made by these accounts
was highest on GooglePlus (2696), followed by Twitter (1776), Face-
book (577), Flickr (387), and YouTube (323). Out of all the homo-
geneous identities, the following are the percentages of accounts
suspended on each OSN – Twitter (60%), YouTube (48%), Google-
Plus (32%) Flickr (33%), and Facebook (4%). Our data is insufficient
to determine whether account suspension is due to dissemination
of content across OSNs or other unobserved spammers’ properties.
Notwithstanding, the association between user identities across
OSNs, strengthens the fact that sharing information about spam-
mer accounts across OSNs could help OSNs to detect spammers
accurately.
Reducing financial loss and victimization: The actual num-
ber of users that are impacted depends on how many victims called
spammers and bought the products advertised by campaigns. Since
it is hard to get this data, we provide a rough estimate of the number
of victims falling for campaigns identified in our dataset. We find
reputation of spammers in terms of their followers count on Twit-
ter, friends / page likes on Facebook, circle count on GooglePlus,
and subscriber count on Youtube. As these users have subscribed
to spammers to get more content, they are likely to fall for the
spam. Some of the users would be the ones who aren’t aware of
the campaign being spam, while some followers / friends could
be spammers themselves who have followed other spammers’ ac-
counts. We again collected this data after 6 months of our data
collection and recorded 637,573 followers on Twitter, 21,053 friends
on Facebook, 11,538 followers on GooglePlus, and 2,816 likes on
YouTube amounting to a total of 670,164 users. Please note that this
number is a lower bound, as we were not able to retrieve statistics
for suspended / deleted accounts. Assume that we transfer knowl-
edge fromTwitter to other OSNs and prevent the onset of campaigns
on other OSNs, we analyzed how much money and victims could
be saved. Looking only at the friends, followers, and likers on Face-
book, GooglePlus, and YouTube respectively, we could save 35,407
(21,053 + 11,538 + 2,816) unique victims and $8.8M (35,407 * $290.9)
by transferring intelligence across OSNs. We used the average cost
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of the Tech Support Spam to be $290.9 per victim, as reported by
Miramirkhani et al. [24].
6 DISCUSSION
In this section, we provide a synthesis of our evaluations and pro-
pose some recommendations to OSN service providers.
How spammers can be choked? Phone numbers are a stable
resource for spam since spammers need to provide their real phone
numbers so that victims can reach out to them. A solution built
around phone numbers, therefore, would be more reliable in bring-
ing down spammers. As a countermeasure, there are two potential
mechanisms – a) phone blacklist and b) suspension of OSN accounts.
A phone blacklist should be created, similar to URL blacklists, to
check if a phone number is involved in a spam / scam campaign.
Blacklisting a phone number would break the connecting link be-
tween victims and spammers, thus bringing down the spammers’
monetization infrastructure. However, it is difficult to create one,
because there are little identifiable features associated with a phone
number as there are with URLs like landing page, some special
characters, domain typo-squatting, etc. Therefore, user suspension
which can be collected from OSNs can come to rescue. From this
research we established that the link between a phone number and
the spammer account is crucial. Thus, one can focus on removing
malicious users from user communities sharing the same phone
number. In this network of user accounts, some users would already
be suspended by OSNs. The labels can be recursively propagated
to other unknown nodes from the known suspended nodes using
several graph-based algorithms like Page Rank. Bringing down
the spammers propagating phone numbers would disintegrate the
entire campaign.
There exist some services, like Truecaller 21 and FTC’s do-not-
call complaint dataset 22, which collect information about phone
numbers that spammers use to call victims (incoming spam commu-
nication). In this work, however, we demonstrated that spammers
advertise their phone numbers across OSNs, so that victims would
call them instead (outgoing spam communication). We found the
overlap between our collected phone numbers (associated with po-
tential spam campaigns) with the FTC (0.001%) and Truecaller (0.4%)
databases to be minimal. It is, therefore, imperative that solutions
also be built on outgoing spam communication.
Measuring Impact usingHoneypots. In this work, we focused
on using friends and followers of the user as a metric to measure
the impact; it might not capture the actual victims who fell for
those campaigns. As an alternative approach, one can simulate a
campaign; changing the phone number (say to phone number X)
and keeping the text intact. There are certain services like Twilio 23
that aid in making calls over the Internet, which can be used to
record the number of calls beingmade to phone number X. Spammer
networks are dense; to ensure that these simulated campaigns are
visible to a large OSN population, one can use Facebook Ads 24
21https://www.truecaller.com/
22https://www.ftc.gov/site-information/open-government/data-sets/
do-not-call-data
23https://www.twilio.com/
24https://www.facebook.com/about/ads
or Twitter Ads 25 for campaign promotion as advertisements. We
believe this is a potential way to measure the impact of campaigns.
7 CONCLUSION
With the convergence of telephony and the Internet, the phone
channel has become an attractive target for spammers to exploit and
monetize spam conducted over the Internet. This paper presents
the first large-scale study of cross-platform spam campaigns that
abuse phone numbers. We collect ∼23 million posts containing ∼1.8
million unique phone numbers from Twitter, Facebook, GooglePlus,
Youtube, and Flickr over a period of six months. We identified 202
campaigns running from all over the world with Indonesia, United
States, India, and the United Arab Emirates being the highest con-
tributors. We showed that even though Indonesian campaigns gen-
erated ∼3.2 million posts, only 1.6% have been suspended so far.
However, the number of accounts suspended in a campaign is not
correlated with volume. Campaigns providing escort services and
technical support solutions had more account suspensions. After
interacting with spammers, we observed that they adopt tactics
similar to legitimate services, to convince victims. By examining
campaigns running across OSNs, we showed that Twitter could sus-
pend∼93%more accounts spreading spam as compared to Facebook.
Therefore, sharing intelligence about spam user accounts across
OSNs can aid in spam detection; ∼35K victims and $8.8M could be
saved based on exploratory analysis of our data. We acknowledge
that our validations on some possible explanations proposed in
this work may be not rigorous, due to difficulties in thoroughly
obtaining spammers’ motivations. However, we believe that our
first-of-its-kind analysis of these phenomena still provides great
value and opens new doors to understand the phone-based spam-
mer ecosystem across OSNs better.
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8 APPENDIX
8.1 Regular Expressions for Data Collection
We used a curated list of 400 keywords like call, SMS, WhatsApp,
ring, contact, dial, reach etc to filter relevant tweets from Twit-
ter’s Streaming API. While extracting phone numbers from the
tweets, we encountered variations in representation of phone num-
bers, for instance the number 1-888-551-2881 can be represented as
1(888)551-2881, 1(888) 551-2881, 1.888.551.2881, or 1 888 551 2881
where all variations were being counted as different phone num-
bers. We filtered out this noise by post-processing the data, where
a couple of regular expressions were used to obtain a valid phone
number from the text obtained from each post, some of which are
listed below.
1. ('(?<= )\d{6}-\d{3}(?= )|
(?<=\[)\d{6}-\d{3}(?=\])|(?<=\()\d{6}-\d{3}(?=\))')
2. (' (\d[\d ]{5,13}\d{2}) ')
3. ('\$ *\d+[\.]*\d+|\d+[\.]*\d+\$')
4. (ur'\xe2\x80\xa6')
5. ('^\d+\s|\s\d+\s|\s\d+$')
8.2 Sample of Transcribed Calls with
Spammers
IVR: Press 1 to know about our products, 2 to check the status of previous
order and 3 for other inquiries
Victim: *pressed 1*
IVR: Press 1 to know more about <company-name> viagra pills and 2 for
other products.
Victim: *pressed 1*
IVR: *call forwarding to human*
Scammer: Hello, I’m <name>, speaking from <company-name>, what would
you like to know about the <brand> viagra pills.
Victim: What are the various packs I can buy and how much does it cost?
Scammer: We have only one variant which costs $99 - $119 for the pills and
$20 for delivery.
Victim: Okay. How can I pay for the order if I decide to order? Do you have
a web portal where I can make an online transaction?
Scammer: No sir, currently, we’re operating only over phone, so you can
provide your VISA card details to me, and I’ll be happy to place the order
for you.
Victim: Is phone the only option? I would like to make the payment through
the web portal.
Scammer: Sorry sir, but we operate only over phone.
Victim: Okay, what are the product guarantees you offer?
Scammer: Yes, sir please be assured that we provide 100% return guarantee.
Victim: Can I get some samples before placing the order?
Scammer: I am sorry sir, we don’t provide samples. Should I place an order
for you?
Victim - No, thank you for the information.
10
